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SAFETY REPORT
The Gulfstream IV operator had all the 
appearance of a good operation but the 
flightcrew lacked cockpit discipline
NTSB finds widespread non-compliance with checklist use and 
control checks, leading to this tragic BED runway overrun crash.
Flightcrew failure to review the checklist and release 
the gust lock prior to the takeoff run of Gulfstream IV 
N121JM on BED’s 7000-ft Rwy 11 as well as failure 
to be time-sensitive and abort the takeoff before 
running out of runway length led to destruction of 
the aircraft and the deaths of all occupants aboard. 
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By Robert Sumwalt
NTSB Board Member
ATP/CFII/FE. Airbus A320, King Air 350, Boeing 
737, Fokker F28, Fokker 100
Gulfstream IV N121JM was frequently used for air transportation both 
domestically and overseas by Lewis Katz, the well-known and highly 
respected publisher of The Philadelphia Inquirer newspaper.
As often is the case in corporate aviation, the pas-sengers were running a few hours late. The 2 pi-lots and flight attendant decided to pass the time 
by ordering a pizza and eating in the comfort of the cabin 
of N121JM, the Gulfstream IV they had operated for 7 
years. When the billionaire principal showed up with 3 
other passengers, they boarded the GIV for the 45-minute 
flight to ACY (Atlantic City Intl, NJ).
The day had started with the expectation of it being an 
easy day. The weather was good and there would be 4 short 
legs with an early afternoon departure and an evening re-
turn. The crew departed ILG (New Castle, Wilmington DE) 
at 1325 edt for the short hop to ACY, where they picked up 
the 4 passengers and flew them to BED (Hanscom Field, 
Bedford MA). After the passengers attended a charity event, 
the plan was to return them to ACY and then reposition the 
Gulfstream back to its home base at ILG.
Tragically, the evening didn’t end that way. Steeped in 
a lethal brew of carelessness and complacency, and fu-
eled by poor cockpit discipline, the flightcrew members 
attempted to take off without disengaging the flight con-
trol gust lock. During the takeoff roll, once realizing the 
gust lock was still engaged, instead of promptly rejecting 
the takeoff the pilots wasted valuable time attempting to 
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Event
Time  
(EDT)
Groundspeed 
(kts)
Distance from 
runway 
threshold (ft)
Distance  
to runway  
end (ft)
Distance to  
runway safety  
area end (ft)
Airplane turns onto runway 11 2139:20 4 96 6915 7935
Brakes released and power increased 2139:34 9 200 6811 7831
Autothrottle engaged 2139:43 44 569 6442 7462
“Couldn’t get” comment on CVR 2139:46.6 65 898 6113 7133
80-kt call on CVR 2139:51.3 90 1516 5495 6515
V1 call on CVR 2139:57.5 119 2612 4399 5419
Rotate call on CVR 2139:58.9 125 2899 4112 5132
First reference to “lock” on CVR 2139:59.9 129 3113 3898 4918
FPSOV activated 2140:05.7 150 4479 2532 3552
Brake pressures start to rise 2140:10.0 162 5638 1373 2393
Peak groundspeed 2140:10.3 162 5694 1317 2337
Last reference to “lock” on CVR 2140:12.6 157 6315 696 1716
Power reduced 2140:14.0 156 6685 326 1346
Reference to stopping ability on CVR 2140:14.3 155 6763 248 1268
Airplane exits runway onto paved overrun area 2140:15.3 151 7011 0 1020
Thrust reversers deployed 2140:15.5 149 7072 -61 959
Airplane exits paved overrun area onto grass 2140:20.0 105 8031 -1020 0
Sound of impact on CVR 2140:21.0 97 8206 -1195 -175
End of FDR data 2140:23.9 90 8662 -1651 -631
Surveyed main wreckage location n/a 0 8880 -1869 -849
Time, Speed & Distance from Rwy Threshold chart showing takeoff time and crash time of GIV N1121JM at BED’s Rwy 11 during aircraft’s takeoff roll.
troubleshoot the problem. The delay in rejecting, along 
with a poorly executed reject, led to a high speed over-
run. The attempted flight ended—along with the lives all 7 
onboard—as the aircraft careened off the runway end and 
became impaled across the banks of the Shawsheen River. 
The aircraft came to a dead stop, decelerating from around 
90 kts to a complete standstill almost instantaneously. The 
aircraft was immediately consumed in a fireball.
The accident sequence
The 2 Rolls-Royce Tay engines were started shortly after 
the passengers boarded at 2128 edt. In the left seat was 
the PIC, a 12 year full-time pilot of SK Travel, the private 
holding company that managed the GIV for its 2 own-
ers. The SIC was a 61 year-old SK Travel chief pilot and 
director of maintenance who had been employed by the 
owners for 27 years.
During the 11 minutes that elapsed between engine 
start and reaching the runway, the cockpit voice record-
er (CVR) registered minimal verbal communications be-
tween the pilots and there was no discussion or mention 
of checklists or flight control checks. As N121JM was 
maneuvered on to BED’s Rwy 11, the PIC commented 
that the rudder limit annunciation had appeared on the 
engine instrument and crew advisory system (EICAS) dis-
play. Although the pilots may have realized this annun-
ciation meant the rudder had reached its stop and could 
not move further, they most likely did not realize it was an 
indication the rudder travel was severely limited  because 
the gust lock was engaged.
When pushing the throttles forward for takeoff, the PIC 
commented on difficulty setting takeoff thrust. The NTSB 
determined the resistance was due to the throttles en-
countering the gust lock/throttle lever interlock that was 
designed to prevent takeoff power from being applied 
when the gust lock was on. At this point, the engines’ 
exhaust pressure ratio (EPR) was 1.42, whereas takeoff 
target EPR was 1.7. Additionally, the throttles lever an-
gle (TLA) position would have been approximately half of 
where it should have been for a normal takeoff.
Despite difficulty setting target EPR and despite en-
countering this abnormal throttle lever position, the PIC 
did not simply pull the throttles back and discontinue the 
takeoff. Speed at this point was less than 50 kts so the 
airplane could have easily been stopped. Instead, the PIC 
engaged the autothrottles and possibly manually nudged 
the throttles, which allowed the engines to accelerate to 
1.6 EPR. Although this EPR setting was less than the tar-
get setting of 1.7 EPR, the PIC continued the takeoff run. 
NTSB determined that engaging the autothrottle and pos-
sibly manually pushing the throttles acted to shear a pin 
in the gust lock handle mechanism. This defeated the gust 
lock/throttle lever interlock and allowed a higher power 
setting even though the gust lock was still engaged.
When the GIV gust lock is engaged, the elevator is 
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locked in the full nose-down position. As the aircraft 
accelerated through 60 kts, the pilots missed a required 
check to confirm that the elevators are free and the con-
trol yoke has moved from the full forward position to neu-
tral as aerodynamic forces act on the elevator. Realizing 
the yoke remained at the full-forward position could have 
been another indication that something was awry.
The SIC called “rotate” at 125 kts. One second later the 
PIC stated, “steer lock is on,” a statement he repeated 6 
more times over the next 12.7 seconds. There is nothing 
on the GIV known as a steer lock, so it is highly likely the 
PIC was referring to the gust lock. When he made the 1st 
“steer lock on” comment, the aircraft’s groundspeed was 
129 kts and there was 3900 ft of runway ahead of him. 
With the addition of the 1000 ft runway overrun, there 
was 4900 ft of pavement ahead of him.
Now 6 seconds after the 1st “steer lock is on” comment, 
the aircraft was accelerating through 150 kts, and hydrau-
lic power to the flight controls was shut off with the flight 
power shutoff (FPSOV) handle. Gulfstream IV pilots know 
once the engines are started, hydraulic pressure from the 
engine-driven hydraulic pumps applies pressure to the 
flight controls. Because of hydraulic loads on the gust lock 
hooks, the gust lock cannot be released once engines are 
started. If engines are started with the gust lock engaged, 
the only approved method of releasing the gust lock is to 
shut down engines, allow hydraulic pressure to fully bleed 
down, then release gust lock and restart the engines.
However, around the Gulfstream community, many pi-
lots knew of an unauthorized technique: If engines were 
mistakenly started with the gust lock on, hydraulic pres-
sure could be relieved by pulling the FPSOV. This would 
supposedly kill hydraulic pressure to the gust lock hooks 
without having to shut down engines. Although unautho-
rized in the first place, the technique was only intended as 
a way to work around having to shut down engines at the 
ramp, and never intended as something used while run-
ning down a runway at high speed.
It’s been now 11 seconds after the “rotate” callout, and 
with a groundspeed of 162 kts, one of the pilots began 
a moderate application of brakes. Just under 1400 ft of 
runway remained at this point, but with the addition of a 
1000 ft runway overrun, there was about 2400 ft of pave-
ment ahead of them. Throttles were retarded 4 seconds 
after the brake application. The PIC said, “I can’t stop it,” 
which was the only verbal communication between the 
2 pilots after the pilot first verbalized “steer lock is on.”
Then 5.5 seconds after brake pressure began to rise, 
thrust reversers were deployed. This was as N121JM de-
parted the runway at 151 kts and traveled onto the paved 
overrun surface. By the time the aircraft departed the 
paved overrun, groundspeed had decreased to 105 kts. 
As the aircraft traveled across grass and a service road, 
it sheared off 3 nonfrangible approach light stanchions 
and part of the localizer antenna. The flight data recorder 
(FDR) ended as the aircraft was still in motion at 90 kts, 
likely indicating the aircraft came to a dead stop at it im-
pacted the banks of the Shawsheen River.
Witnesses reported that the aircraft became engulfed in 
flames “almost instantaneously.” The investigation deter-
mined that the impact forces were likely survivable but 
the occupants succumbed to smoke inhalation and ther-
mal injuries. The PIC was found kneeling on his seat with 
his head leaning against the left cockpit wall. His oxy-
gen mask compartment was found in the open position 
with the oxygen mask laying on the floor near him. One 
passenger was found in the aisle next to and facing the 
forward entry door.
Like so many, it was a crash that should never have 
happened. There are several protective layers of defense 
intended to prevent such a catastrophe – layers such as 
cockpit checklists and flight control checks, as well as an 
aircraft system that was designed to prevent throttles from 
being set to high power settings with the gust lock on. 
However, as the investigation revealed, those protective 
layers were riddled with holes.
Cockpit layers of defense 
Releasing the gust lock is the 4th item on the GIV Starting 
Engines checklist contained in the airplane flight manual 
(AFM), as well as the FlightSafety checklist used by the pi-
lots in training. Not only did the CVR reveal this checklist 
was not verbalized, but neither of the 4 remaining check-
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Cockpit location diagram of the gust lock itself for the GIV. Gulfstream 
has redesigned and improved gust lock design for their newer models.
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lists were verbalized either. Although it’s possible that the 
checklists could have been accomplished silently, which 
would have been contrary to their training which called 
for “challenge-response” checklist execution, the NTSB 
noted there was no discussion of checklists before, during, 
or after engine start or throughout taxi, and there were no 
cockpit statements recorded to denote the checklists were 
completed. Furthermore, a contract pilot who had flown 
with one of the pilots a few years before the crash told 
investigators that the pilot did not use checklists, but rath-
er, had memorized a way of doing things. The NTSB con-
cluded “the crewmembers’ lack of adherence to industry 
best practices involving the execution of normal checklists 
eliminated the opportunity for them to recognize that the 
gust lock handle was in the ON position and delayed their 
detection of this error.” Obviously, there was a big hole in 
the checklist layer of defense.
Another cockpit layer of defense that could have detect-
ed locked flight controls was, of course, the flight control 
check. The FDR revealed no such check was performed 
for this ill-fated flight. NTSB made an even more troubling 
discovery when examining a quick access recorder. Of the 
175 previous flights, a complete flight control check was 
skipped on all but 2 flights. “Given that the flightcrew ne-
glected to perform complete flight control checks before 
98% of the crewmembers’ previous 175 takeoffs in the air-
plane, the flightcrew’s omission of a flight control check 
before the accident takeoff indicates intentional, habitual 
noncompliance with standard operating procedures,” stat-
ed the NTSB. Another big hole in the layers of defense.
Aircraft layers of defense
The final protective layer of defense that could have 
prevented a takeoff with the gust lock engaged was a 
throttle interlock that would prevent significant throttle 
lever advancement with the gust lock on. However, this 
layer was ineffective due to a defective design.
FAA certification regulations for transport category air-
craft specify that if the gust lock is engaged, the system 
must “limit the operation of the airplane so that the pilot 
receives unmistakable warning at the start of takeoff.” To 
comply with that regulation, Gulfstream designed, and 
FAA approved, a throttle interlock that was supposed to 
prevent the throttles from moving more than 6 degrees 
throttle lever angle (TLA) from the idle stop if the gust lock 
was engaged. To put this movement into perspective, total 
TLA range of movement from idle to full throttle on the 
GIV is 59 degrees.
Post-accident testing on the accident airplane’s throttle 
quadrant found the throttles could be moved to 22 de-
grees TLA with the gust lock engaged. Furthermore, NTSB 
tested several in-service GIV’s with the gust lock on. Like 
the accident airplane, the TLA of those in-service Gulf-
streams could be moved 3 to 4 times greater than the 
designed 6-degree limit. As a result, NTSB determined the 
GIV gust lock system does not comply with certification 
standards. Gulfstream is working to create a fix, which is 
anticipated to be available in the coming months.
Deadly delay
Of course, it’s easy to look back after the fact and say 
“if they had only done this.” True, but it is important to 
dissect the sequence of events in order to discover ways 
future crashes can be prevented.
Once on the runway, the pilots had an opportunity to 
realize something was not right when the PIC had dif-
ficulty setting takeoff thrust. “Despite encountering this 
abnormal throttle lever position, the PIC did not immedi-
ately call out the problem or call for a rejected takeoff,” 
stated NTSB. Instead, he engaged the autothrottles and 
possibly provided some manual force on the throttles to 
achieve a somewhat higher thrust setting and continued 
the takeoff run. “It is unclear why the PIC engaged the au-
tothrottle, as it would seem extremely imprudent to con-
tinue a takeoff after encountering a substantial restriction 
to throttle lever movement while setting takeoff power,” 
stated NTSB. However, what is clear is the aircraft’s speed 
was less than 50 kts and the takeoff could have easily 
Rwy 11-29 at BED Hanscom Field is 7001 x 150 ft plus there is 
another 1000 ft of paved overrun before the abrupt encounter with 
the raised bank of the Shawsheen River.
6 PROFESSIONAL PILOT / November 2015
been discontinued at this point.
Pilots are taught not to reject takeoff after V1, and for 
good reason. After all, accident files are full of cases where 
an aborted takeoff after V1 didn’t work out well. However, 
one exception to this rule is if the airplane’s ability to fly is 
in doubt. In the case of N121JM, the PIC was undoubtedly 
aware that the gust lock was still on when he tried to rotate, 
as evidenced by his calling out “steer lock is on” 7 times. 
Having the gust lock on obviously would prevent the air-
craft from flying, so a rejected takeoff would be the only 
viable option at this point. However, instead of promptly 
rejecting the takeoff, he elected to troubleshoot the situa-
tion while the aircraft was accelerating approximately 3.5 
kts per second.
NTSB determined that if the takeoff had been rejected 
immediately upon the PIC’s 1st “steer lock is on” state-
ment or anytime in the next 11 seconds, and had the 
proper RTO procedure been used, the aircraft could have 
been stopped on the paved surface. However, as noted by 
NTSB, “the flightcrew delayed initiating a rejected takeoff 
for about 10 seconds, and a further delay of 4 seconds 
existed between brake application and power reduction. 
Therefore, the rejected takeoff was not initiated until the 
accident was unavoidable.”
Probable cause
On September 9 NTSB met to deliberate the crash of 
N121JM. The board adopted the following: “The NTSB 
determines that the probable cause of this accident was 
the flightcrew members’ failure to perform the flight con-
trol check before takeoff, their attempt to take off with 
the gust lock system engaged, and their delayed execu-
tion of a rejected takeoff after they became aware that the 
controls were locked. Contributing to the accident were 
the flightcrew’s habitual noncompliance with checklists, 
Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation’s failure to ensure that 
the GIV gust lock/throttle lever interlock system would 
prevent an attempted takeoff with the gust lock engaged, 
and the FAA’s failure to detect this inadequacy during the 
Gulfstream IV’s certification.”
NTSB issued 3 safety recommendations to FAA, 1 to 
International Business Aviation Council, and 1 to NBAA. 
The 71 page report is available at www.ntsb.gov. As one 
of the 3 board members who participated in adopting the 
report, I filed a concurring statement, which is contained 
in entirety in the sidebar.
On a personal note, in the 9 years I’ve been member of 
the NTSB, I’ve been involved in deliberating upward of 
150 or so transportation accidents. This one was particu-
larly disturbing because it was so preventable. We’ve cer-
tainly seen operators who were trying to skirt regulations, 
but this operator, I’m afraid, thought they were better than 
they really were. Their comfort led to complacency. Com-
placency kills. And it certainly did in this case.
To all outward appearances, SK Travel had the hallmarks of a well-run flight department. They were operating a top-of-the-line business jet. 
They had long-time employment stability – something not often found 
with small aviation departments. They did their training at FlightSafety 
International instead of just trying to do it “on the cheap.” The chief pilot 
was described as being very meticulous about the airplane’s mainte-
nance. They had undergone 2 voluntary industry audits and were pre-
paring for their 3rd audit, which is a remarkable feat.
The auditor for their 2nd voluntary audit had the following glowing 
comments:
• “The Safety Management System (SMS) of this operator is  
        well-developed.”
• “Best practices are consistently employed in all facets of the program.”
• “Continuous SMS improvement is actively pursued.”
• “The flight operations manual is remarkably well-written and  
       comprehensive.”
• “Safety culture within the department is shared among all team  
        members.”
• “Open reporting of hazards is consistently encouraged by management.”
• “Solid safety program, maturing nicely.”
Despite these positive comments, our investigation revealed an opera-
tion in which checklists and flight control checks were not accomplished by 
the flightcrew, as specified in their training and the aircraft operations man-
ual. In order to successfully complete training, neither of these omissions 
would have been acceptable. However, considering that each crewmember 
successfully completed recurrent training 8 months before the crash, they 
obviously knew and demonstrated they were aware of these requirements.
Given that they knew how they were supposed to operate, why did 
these flightcrew members perform to the contrary? Why did they inten-
tionally act one way when being checked, and perform another way—a 
way contrary to basic good airmanship—in actual operations?
Complacency is one explanation that comes to mind. Perhaps an 
overconfidence developed out of routine, wherein the flightcrew believed 
their method of operations didn’t require these procedural items. What-
ever the reason, the result proved catastrophic.
Although the flightcrew members may have become complacent, I 
have to believe the owners of this airplane expected the pilots to always 
operate in conformity with—or exceeding—training, aircraft manufac-
turer requirements, and industry best practices. Yet, as evidence showed 
in this investigation, once seated in their cockpit, these crewmembers 
operated in a manner that was far, far from acceptable.
There is a saying: “You can fool the auditors, but never fool yourself.” 
These pilots made the critical mistake of attempting to fool both. And 
this mistake was costly, unfortunate and tragic.
I hope the lessons from this crash can be used to emphasize the critical 
need to combat complacency, eradicate intentional noncompliance and 
perform like true professionals. Passengers who place their lives in the 
hands of flightcrews deserve and expect no less.
Complacency and overconfidence can lead to disaster.
Robert Sumwalt was appointed to NTSB 
in 2006 by President George W. Bush 
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Always use the checklist
